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II. STA TEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition.

B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts
1.

Introduction

Shane Crawford was charged in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2010-7100 with two
counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen ("Counts I and II") and two counts of
Sexual Abuse of a Child Under Sixteen. (CR 5.) Mr. Crawford entered not guilty pleas to the
four charges and was represented at trial by attorney Matt Roker. (Id.) He was found guilty by a
jury of the two lewd conduct counts and not guilty of the two sexual abuse counts. He was
sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five-years with six years fixed on each count. (CR.
4-5.)
2.

Testimony at the trial

The state's first witness was As.C. She was the alleged victim in Count I. As.C. testified
that she is Mr. Crawford's daughter and that in 2009 she was living in a home with him and the
restofherfamily. (Tpg.196, ln. 1-pg. 198, ln. 5.) 1 AfewmonthsbeforeJulyof2009,As.C.
and Mr. Crawford were watching a movie while laying on the couch in the living room. (T pg.
198, In. 6 - pg. 199, In. 19.) As.C. testified that while lying on the couch, Mr. Crawford "started
reaching up my shirt and groping my breasts and then he started going down into my panties and
began touching my vagina." (T pg. 199, ln. 21 - 25.) As.C. elaborated that Mr. Crawford's hand

Mr. Crawford attached a copy of the trial transcript to his petition and asked that the
court take judicial notice of it. (CR 11, 257.) The court granted the motion. (Transcript Post
Conviction Proceedings (8/7/2013) pg. 11, In. 12-16.)
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was over her bra feeling her breasts and that "he was feeling down into my crotch area." (T pg.
200, In. 12 - pg. 201, In. 7.) As.C. thought the entire event lasted about 30 minutes and when
"he was going onto my vagina" she left to go play video games upstairs. (T pg. 201, In. 18-25.)
The next witness was Tracy Crawford, Mr. Crawford's ex-wife. (T pg. 218, In. 7 - pg
.219, In. 3.) Ms. Crawford testified about the family relationships and the divorce, and was
allowed to testify about both An.C. and As.C. making disclosures to her regarding being sexually
touched by Mr. Crawford. (T pg. 218, In. 12 -pg. 234, In. 6.)
An.C. was the next witness. An.C. was the victim in Count IL An.C. testified that she is
also Mr. Crawford's daughter. (T pg. 238, In. 8-16.) She claimed that when she was in 8th
grade, Mr. Crawford offered her an alcoholic drink and asked her if she knew what a clit was. (T
pg. 242, In. 17-18.) An.C. responded that she "did not know what that was." Id An.C. then
testified that "He said, 'Well let me show you,' and then was going to show me and I, like,
backed away when he was going to show me." (T pg. 243, In. 10-12.) When the prosecutor
asked "So, did his hand touch you?", An.C. responded "Yeah." (T pg. 243, In. 10-16.) But when
asked "Where did he touch you?", An.C. testified, "Outside of my vaginal area." (T pg. 243, In.
15-16.)
The state argued to the jury and later confirmed to the Court that the "clit incident" was
the incident which constituted Count II. (T pg. 498, In. 5-14; pg. 545, In. 8 - pg. 546, In. 6.)
On another occasion, when An.C. was about 13 years old, she was on the couch with Mr.
Crawford and he was rubbing her leg up toward her privates, outside of her bikini line. (T pg.
244, In. 20 - pg. 245, In. 21.) Around Christmas of 2008, Mr. Crawford allegedly pulled out his
penis and tried to show it to An.C., but she looked away. (T pg. 248, In. 24 - pg. 251, In. 11.) At
2

a party, Mr. Crawford allegedly grabbed An.C.'s breast in front of others in a joking way. (T pg.
251, ln. 12-pg. 253, ln. 11.) Another time, while on the phone with her grandfather, Mr.
Crawford began rubbing An.C.'s stomach and moving his hand toward her shirt; she kept batting
it away before he could touch any private areas. (T pg. 254, ln. 1 - pg. 257, In. 2.)
The state then presented the testimony of the detective assigned the case and a counselor
specializing in counseling sexually abused children. (T pg. 274, In. 22 - pg. 335, ln. 7.) The
state's last witness was Sharon Crawford, Mr. Crawford's mother, who noted that the girls had
disclosed that Mr. Crawford had been touching them in a way that made them uncomfortable, but
saw nothing sexual about the touching they reported. (T pg. 346, ln. 1-16; pg. 351, In. 22- pg.
352, In. 4.)
Mr. Crawford called his son, Nolan Crawford. (T pg. 405, ln. 5-12.) Nolan testified that
his father had a good relationship with his family, that he knew that An.C. had walked in on her
father in states of undress in the bathroom and had walked in on her parents having sex. (T pg.
407, In. 8-pg. 413, ln.19; pg. 415, In. 18-pg. 416, In. 4.) George Crawford, his other son,
testified similarly. (T pg. 429, ln. 1 - pg. 435, In. 18.) The defense then rested. (T pg. 462, In.
6-7.)
The state then recalled An.C. who testified that she had walked in on her parents having
sex in their bathroom. (T pg. 465, In. 3 - pg. 467, In. 5.) The state then rested. (T pg. 469, In.
4.) No I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was made by defense counsel.
The jury was instructed and excused to deliberate. (T pg. 482, In. 7 - pg. 492, In. 7, pg.
534, In. 12.) During deliberations, the jury sent a number of questions to the judge. (T pg. 542,
In. 6 - pg. 546, In. 2.) Question number three had two parts, as follows:
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[l .] In order to have committed manual - genital contact does it require touching the
vaginal area?
[2.] Does touching of breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?
In response to part two, defense counsel stated that the answer was "no." (T pg. 544, ln. 21.)
The district court stated that it was "not going to define for them manual-genital." (T pg. 544, ln.
21-24.) The state asked that the jury just be informed that they needed to reread the instructions.
(T p. 545, In. 6-7.) The district court noted:
Well, if the jury - I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there is case law
that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but that while while it may see - it's tempting to want to define every single word, that it's
inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors have to apply their
understanding - their common ordinary understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm
just going to tell them to reread the instructions.
(T p. 545, ln. 8-18.) The jury was then specifically informed, "Please re-read all the
instructions." (CR 68.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts I and II after being so instructed. (CR 8.)
Mr. Crawford appealed. (CR 5.) Elizabeth Allred of the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office represented Mr. Crawford on appeal. (Id.) On June 27, 2012, the Court of
Appeals vacated the conviction on Count I, but affirmed on Count II and also affinned the
sentence with respect to Count II. State v. Crawford, No. 38587, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No.
538. The Court of Appeals vacated Count I because the trial court failed to adequately answer
the second part of jury inquiry #3: "Does touching of the breast area constitute manual-genital
contact?" The Court of Appeals found that the Court's failure to clarify that the breast was not a
genital for purposes of the lewd conduct statute was error, but also that only Count I involved an
incident where there were allegations of breast touching. Thus, the error was harmless as to
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Count IL (A true and correct copy of the Court's opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
The Remittitur in the appeal was filed in the district court on August 23, 2012. (CR 6.)
On September 14, 2012, the state moved to dismiss Count I. On October 3, 2012, the district
court granted the motion to dismiss, leaving only the judgment and sentence as to Count II
remammg. (CR 6.)
3.

Proceedings upon post-conviction petition

On July 2, 2013, Mr. Crawford filed a petition for post-conviction relief as to Count II
alleging that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. (CR 4.) He alleged that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal under I. C.R. 29(a)
due to insufficiency of the evidence as to Count II. He alleged that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction on Count II as a matter of law because An.C. did not testify
that Mr. Crawford touched her genitalia and the state did not present any other evidence that Mr.
Crawford touched An.C.'s genitalia at that time. (CR 6-10.)
He also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective during jury deliberations. Mr. Crawford
alleged that trial counsel's performance was deficient because a reasonably competent attorney
would have requested that the Court answer "yes" in response to the first part of the jury's
question: "In order to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the
vaginal area?" or have asked the court to define the word "genital." He also alleged that trial
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Crawford because, had the court instructed the
jury on the definition of "genital," or instructed the jury that it had to find that Mr. Crawford
manually touched the vaginal area of As.C. (in Count I) and/or An.C. (in Count II), the jury
would have acquitted Mr. Crawford of Count II because there was no evidence of manual-genital
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touching to support a conviction on that count. (CR 9-10.)
Mr. Crawford also alleged that he was prejudiced because appellate counsel could not
raise the issue of whether the trial court should have instructed the jury as to the definition of
"genital" or that it should have instructed the jury that it had to find that Mr. Crawford manually
touched the vaginal area of A.C. (in Count I) and/or An.C. (in Count II) because trial counsel
failed to preserve that issue for appeal. Had the issue been preserved for appeal, the Court of
Appeals would have reversed the conviction on Count II due to the trial court's jury instruction
error. (CR 10.)
Finally, Mr. Crawford alleged that appellate counsel's performance was deficient because
a reasonably competent appellate attorney would have raised a sufficiency of the evidence claim
as to Count II given the insufficiency of proof, especially as there were not stronger issues to
raise on appeal as to Count II. He also alleged appellate counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced Mr. Crawford because had she raised an insufficiency of the evidence challenge as to
Count II on appeal, the Court of Appeals would have vacated the conviction and ordered that a
judgment of acquittal enter as to that count. (CR 11.)
In support of the petition; Mr. Crawford attached as Exhibits the trial transcripts, the
Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs in the direct appeal and the Court of Appeals' unpublished
opinion. (CR 11.) The Court later took judicial notice of the trial transcripts. (TPCP (8/7/2013)
pg. 12, In. 12-16.)
The state filed an Answer and a Motion for Summary Disposition. (CR 266, 278.) Mr.
Crawford filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition. (CR 281.) After briefing and a
hearing, the court denied Mr. Crawford's motion, granted the state's motion and dismissed the
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case (CR 323, 337.)
A timely notice of appeal was filed. (CR 339.) On March 24, 2014, a Corrected Final
Judgment was filed by the district court.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Did the trial court err in finding trial and appellate counsels' performances were not
deficient because there was sufficient evidence in the trial record to support the conviction on
Count II? If so, was the error prejudicial?
B. Did the trial court misapply the Court of Appeals' opinion in Mintun v. State, 144
Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007), when dismissing the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim, as the sufficiency of the evidence claim was the strongest issue which could have
been raised with regard to Count II?
C. Did the trial court err in finding that trial counsel's failure to request an affirmative
answer to the jury's inquiry or to request the court to define the word "genitalia" was not deficient
performance? If so, was the error prejudicial?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding Trial and Appellate Counsels' Performances Were
Not Deficient. There Was Insufficient Evidence in the Trial Record to Support the
Conviction on Count II. The Error Prejudiced Petitioner.
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v.
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California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of
that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. An
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in

Strickland See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho at 658, 168 P.3d at 42.
The Due Process Clauses of the United States and State Constitutions preclude conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which a defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In short, Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element
of the offense.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). In the case where a properly instructed jury has
convicted, even though no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
that conviction cannot constitutionally stand. Jackson, 443 U.S., pg. 318.
Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will determine, based upon
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its independent consideration of the evidence, whether there was substantial and competent
evidence to support the verdict. State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499,501, 36 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Ct.
App. 2001). Put in constitutional terms: "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S., pg. 319.
1.

Trial counsel

Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a judgment of acquittal as to
Count II.
Here is the testimony from An.C regarding Count II:
Q. And so do you remember a time when you were in the kitchen with your dad?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So what were you doing in the kitchen?
A. He was offering me an alcoholic drink and I told him I didn't want any alcohol.
And I don't know how the conversation got brought up, but he asked me what a
clit was and I told him I didn't know what that was.

Q. And then what did he do?

A. He said, Well, let me show you," and then went to show me, and I, like, backed
away when he was going to show me.
Q. Okay. So did his hands touch you?

A. Yeah.
Q. Where did they touch you?
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A. Outside of my vaginal area.
(T pg. 242, ln. 3 - pg. 243, ln. 16.) After her testimony about being touched outside of her vaginal
area, An.C testified as follows:
Q. Okay. So was he going down, like down from your shorts or was he going up?

A. Up.
(T pg. 243, ln. 13-19.)
An.C. testified that Mr. Crawford was reaching up her shorts and he touched outside her
vaginal area. It makes sense that he was not able to reach her vaginal area in light of An.C's
testimony that she "backed away when he was going to show me." (T pg. 243, ln. 11-12.)
However, being touched "outside of my vaginal area" is not sufficient to prove the allegation in
Count II, which alleged manual-genital touching. (CR 67).
An.C's trial testimony that she was touched outside of her vaginal area is corroborated by
her prior statements to Detective Ellis. The detective testified:
Q. Yeah, on the day that the alcohol use was involved. I believe there was an
allegation by [An.CJ that the father had brought up the issue of do you know what
a clit is.

A. Correct.
Q. Do you remember that?

A. Right. That was the day in the kitchen where he -Q. Yes.

A. Yes
Q. And did [AC] [verbatim] tell you what her response was when she indicated
that her father had made a quick move toward her to show her what a clit was?
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A. Yes, she indicated that he had reached his hand up the pant leg of her shorts.
Q. Okay.
A. He was trying to get her - get his hand inside of her underwear and she stepped
away from him and told him no.

(T pg. 284, In. 24 - pg. 285, In. 18.) (Emphasis added.) An.C did not tell Detective Ellis that she
was touched on her vaginal area. An.C told the detective that Mr. Crawford touched under her
pant leg in an attempt to get his hand inside her underwear, but she avoided that contact by
stepping away. An.C's prior statement confirms her trial testimony that she was touched outside
of her vaginal area.
There was insufficient evidence to support Count II because the state did not produce any
evidence that Mr. Crawford touched the genitals of An.C. during the "clit incident." The evidence
was only that he touched outside of her vaginal area. Consequently, it was ineffective assistance
of trial counsel to fail to move the court for a judgment of acquittal under I. C.R. 29.
The trial court rejected Mr. Crawford's argument writing as follows:
Crawford attempts to reinterpret what the victim meant. However, applying
ordinary meanings, the vagina is an internal organ. It is defined and understood to
be "the passage from the vulva to the womb in woman." See OXFORD AMERICAN
PAPERBACK DICTIONARY 1027 (1980). Thus, the external genitalia are "outside"
the vaginal area. Outside is defined as "the outer side of a surface." Id., at 634. A
jury could reasonably understand her testimony to be referring to the external
genitalia (or outside the vaginal area) which is what is required under the statute
for a conviction. Therefore, this testimony, especially combined with the jury's
determination of her credibility, is sufficient to sustain the conviction.
(CR 330-331 ). The court's analysis is in error and should be rejected for several reasons.
First, the court's analysis is illogical. Even if one assumes that An.C meant to say that she
was not touched on the vagina but elsewhere, as the court finds, that is still not sufficient
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evidence. Being touched somewhere other than the vagina does not mean the touching occurred
on genitalia, as required for conviction.
Second, the testimony was that An.C. was touched outside her "vaginal area" not outside
of her "vagina" and the term "vaginal area" means the area containing all of the external female
genitalia. Genitalia is defined as "the organs of the reproductive system; especially: the external
genital organs." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/genitalia. "The female internal
genitalia are the ovaries, Fallopian tubes, uterus, cervix, and vagina. The female external genitalia
are the labia minora and majora (the vulva) and the clitoris."
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey= 113 72.
In interpreting a statute, the words used "should be given their plain, usual and ordinary
meaning." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011 ), quoting, Farber v.
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P .3d 289, 292 (2009); see also McLean v.
Maverik County Stores, Inc. 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). The term "vaginal

area" is regularly used as a synonym of female external genitalia in Idaho case law. See, e.g.,
State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 220, 970 P .2d 10, 13 (1998) ("The issue whether Cardell

deliberately touched R.S. 's vaginal area was a material and disputed issue concerning the crime
charged. Although Cardell did not deny that he gave R.S. a massage, which included nipple
manipulation and massaging the upper thighs of R.S., he testified he never massaged R.S.'s
vaginal area. Instead, Cardell testified that he never rubbed the victim's genitals and that as he
massaged the inner thigh his hand would have been touching the outside of the vaginal area but at
no time did he directly touch R.S.'s vagina."); State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 79, 878 P.2d 776, 778
(1994) (Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen case where the state's evidence was that "both

12

the victim and her brother testified that Lewis had kissed the victim's vaginal area."); State v.

McGuire, 135 Idaho 535,536, 20 P.3d 719, 720 (Ct. App. 2001) (In a Sexual Abuse of a Minor
Case: "McGuire put his arms on S.M.'s thighs and then began touching S.M.'s hips and rubbing
her stomach just above her vaginal area. McGuire rubbed S.M. in this manner for 'quite a while.'
McGuire also rubbed S.M.'s inner thigh near her vaginal area during this incident."); State v.

Pepcorn, 37314, 2011 WL 1366779 (Ct. App. 2011) ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 152 Idaho 678,
273 P.3d 1271 (2012). ("The State's evidence vis-a-vis A.J. was that Pepcom had committed ...
committed lewd and lascivious conduct by placing his hand on her vaginal area and bottom and
massaging there while he lifted her up onto a horse."). It is also a synonym in common usage.

See, e.g., State v. Weimer, 133 Idaho 442,446,988 P.2d 216,220 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Officer
Murphy stated that the subject, a young teenage girl, 'was in some lingerie, women's lingerie,
posing in a sexually explicit position. I could tell by the picture she had no pubic hair around her
vaginal area."') and State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412,299 P.3d 219,222 (2013) (Testimony of
complaining witness: "He apparently didn't get the reaction he wanted, and he moved down to my
vaginal area .... He started touching me outside, and then he started putting his fingers inside me
really hard."). When An.C. testified she was touched outside of her vaginal area she was
testifying that she was not touched on her genitalia.
An.C. never claimed there was penetration of her genitalia, which would be required in
order to touch her vagina, consequently, the state was required to prove manual touching of
An.C.'s external genitalia. This required the state to prove that Mr. Crawford touched An.C.'s
"vaginal area," where the external female genitalia is located. But all it proved was that he
touched her "outside [her] vaginal area," i.e., not on her vaginal area, but elsewhere, e.g., the inner
13

or upper thigh, leg, or hip. Being touched outside the vaginal area cannot constitute manualgenital touching and the trial court's conclusion that the state's evidence was sufficient is
erroneous. As all the external female genitalia is within the vaginal area, manual touching of
An.C's vaginal area is a fact the state needed to, but did not, prove at trial.
Since a Rule 29 motion would have or should have been granted at trial, it was deficient
performance for trial counsel to not make the motion.
2.

Appellate counsel

Appellate counsel was also ineffective because she failed to raise the sufficiency of the
evidence claim as to Count II on appeal. The trial court, however, dismissed the appellate counsel
claim reasserting that "the evidence gave rise to reasonable inferences of guilt on Count II." (CR
334.) The court's argument in this regard fails for the reasons set forth above.
Appellate counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because had the sufficiency of
evidence issue been raised on appeal, the Court of Appeals would have vacated the conviction and
remanded the case for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
3.

Conclusion

In sum, had trial counsel raised the sufficiency issue, the trial court would have found or
should have found there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on Count IL Had
appellate counsel raised the issue, the Court of Appeals would have found that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on Count II. Therefore, Mr. Crawford was
prejudiced under Strickland's definition by trial and appellate counsels' failure to raise the issue.
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B.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding Appellate Counsel's Performance Was Not Deficient.
The Sufficiency Argument Was the Strongest Issue to Raise on Appeal Applicable to
Count II. Petitioner Was Prejudiced.
Moreover, the court, in dismissing the appellate counsel claim, misapplied the rule in

Mintun v. State, that "only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the
presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome." 144 Idaho at 661, 168 P.3d at 45,
quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,288 (2000) citing Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644,646 (7th
Cir. 1986). The district court took this rule to mean that since "[a]ppellate counsel raised the
strongest issue on appeal - that the Court erred as a matter of law in instructing the jury," counsel
could not be ineffective for failing to raise other meritorious issues. (CR 334-335.) That,
however, is not what Mintun holds. The fact that one issue raised is arguably stronger than
another issue does not per se excuse the failure to raise the second issue. Further, appellate
counsel raised an issue which was clearly weaker than the sufficiency of the evidence issue, i.e.,
the claim that the sentence was clearly excessive.
There could not have been a strategic reason to not to raise the sufficiency of the evidence
issue. The remedy for the claim, a judgment of acquittal, was more favorable to Mr. Crawford
than the remedy for the jury instruction issue, a new trial. In addition, the issue was clearly
stronger that the jury instruction issue because that issue was only applicable to Count I and
appellate counsel did not raise any meritorious issue challenging the validity of Count II. The
sufficiency of the evidence issue was the strongest issue with regard to Count II and it was
deficient performance to discard it in favor of the issues actually raised. In fact, prevailing on
appeal on the jury instruction issue turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for Mr. Crawford. Upon
remand, the state simply moved to dismiss Count I leaving the concmTent sentence for Count II
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in place. Mr. Crawford did not receive any tangible benefit from the appeal as the time he was
sentenced to was not reduced. As Mr. Crawford's sentence could only be reduced by defeating
the convictions for both counts, appellate counsel's failure to raise the strongest issue attacking
Count II was deficient performance which prejudiced Mr. Crawford.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding That Trial Counsel's Failure to Request an
Affirmative Answer to the Jury's Inquiry or to Request the Court to Define the Word
"Genitalia" Was Not Deficient Performance. The Error Prejudiced Petitioner.
Mr. Crawford also argued that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ask the court, in

response to the first part of question #3, to either tell the jury that manual contact with the vaginal
area was required or to define "genital." Had trial counsel made a proper request, the district
court would have given the jury proper instructions and the jury would have acquitted him of
both Counts I and II. (CR 9-10.)
Due to trial counsel's failure to object, appellate counsel was not able to raise the jury
instruction error regarding that particular jury question. "Generally Idaho's appellate courts will
not consider error not preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Had the issue been preserved, the Court of Appeals
would have vacated the conviction on Count II under the same reasoning it vacated the
conviction on Count I. State v. Crawford, pg. 4.
The trial court dismissed this aspect of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for
the following reasons:
[1.] It has long been the rule in Idaho that ordinary words used in the sense in
which they are generally understood need not be defined in jury instructions. It is
not error to refuse to define ordinary words. The term "genital" is commonly
understood and requires no further explanation. Therefore, it was not error to not
request the Court to define the term.
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[2.] Moreover, a "yes" answer would not have been accurate. As Crawford
recognizes, genitalia consists of both internal and external organs. As discussed
above, the vagina and the vaginal area technically refer to the internal organs. The
external genitalia are "outside" the vaginal area. Outside is defined as "the outer
side of a surface." Therefore, the answer "yes" may have further confused the
JUry.

[3.] Finally, because the victim clearly testified Crawford touched the "outside of
the vaginal area[,]" a jury could reasonably understand her testimony to be
referencing the external genitalia which is what is required under the statute for a
conviction.
(CR 332.) (Citations omitted.) The court's analysis, however, is in error on all three points.
Addressing the court's third reason first: An.C. did not testify that she was touched on
"the 'outside of the vaginal area."' (Id.) She testified that she was touched, "Outside of my
vaginal area." (T pg. 242, ln. 3 - pg. 243, ln. 16.) The court's inadvertent insertion of the article
"the" totally changes An.C's actual testimony. The court's misquotation caused it to
misunderstand the actual testimony. A jury, however, could not reasonably understand being
touched outside of the vaginal area as meaning An.C. was touched upon her external genitalia.
Plainly, this misquote is in error and does not support the trial court's ruling. 2
Second, the court had a duty to further instruct the jury. This is made clear by the Court
of Appeals in the direct appeal where it wrote, "if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a
point of law pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity, or gap in the
instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law as are

The Court of Appeals made the same error when wrote that An.C. testified that Mr.
Crawford "put his hand up her shorts and touched the outside of her vaginal area," (Exhibit A,
pg. 2.) Trial and appellate counsel are to blame that the Court of Appeals did not have a correct
understanding of the record. Had either counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to
show manual-genital touching, the Court of Appeals would have set forth the actual testimony
verbatim.
2
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reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion." State v. Crawford, Exhibit A,
pg. 4, citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). Sheahan, in tum,
relied upon Dawson v. Olson, 97 Idaho 274, 543 P.2d 499 (1975), where the Supreme Court
wrote, "There may be situations in which a trial judge may decline to answer questions put by the
jury, but where a jury returns on its own motion indicating confusion, the court has the duty to
give such additional instruction on the law as the court may think necessary to clarify the jury's
doubt or confusion." 97 Idaho at 281, 543 P.2d at 507, quoting Worthington v. Obertuber, 125
A.2d 621 (Penn. 1966). In addition, LC.§§ 19-2132(a) and 19-2204 provide that the trial court
must instruct the jurors on all matters of law necessary for their information.
Just as the jury's second question ("Does touching of the breast area constitute manualgenital contact?") imposed upon the trial court a "duty to give additional instructions on the law
reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion," the jury's first question ("In
order to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area?")
showed that the jury was confused about whether the evidence on Count II, i.e., that Mr.
Crawford touched An.C. "Outside of [her] vaginal area" was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
(T pg. 243, ln. 15-16.) Trial counsel should have asked the trial court to give additional
instructions on this issue.
Finally, a "yes" answer to the jury's first question would have been accurate and would
not have confused the jury. Under the facts of the case, the "clit incident" was the basis for
Count II. There was no allegation of any penetration or touching of the internal genitalia during
that incident. To the contrary, An.C. testified that she was moving away from Mr. Crawford in
order to avoid his touch. The jury could not have been wondering whether there had to be
18

internal touching of the genitalia. The jury's second question makes it clear that it understood
external touching was sufficient as it was wondering whether the touching of An.S.'s breasts was
sufficient to support Count I. The jury in the first question knew that external touching within
the vaginal area, i.e., the external genitalia, was sufficient, but was confused over whether being
touched outside the vaginal area was sufficient to prove Count II because that was all An.C.
testified to. 3
As the jury was confused on this point of law and the answer to the question was "yes,"
and there was no evidence that An.C was touched on her vaginal area, a reasonably competent
attorney would have requested the court answer the above question in the affirmative or asked
the court to define the word "genital," so the jury could come to the same answer on its own.
Thus, trial counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, supra.
Had the jury question been answered properly, the jury would have acquitted Mr.
Crawford. But even if the trial court had denied defense counsel's request, the request would
have preserved the issue for appeal and alerted appellate counsel to the issue. The Court of
Appeals would have reversed the conviction on Count II due to the Court's jury instruction error.
Thus, trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial under Strickland and the trial court
erred in summarily dismissing this aspect of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.

While the trial court noted that one definition of "outside," is "the outer side of a
surface," it is not the only definition. An.C. used the more common meaning of the word, i.e., "a
place or region beyond an enclosure or boundary."
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outside.
3
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V. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in denying Mr. Crawford's motion for summary disposition and in
granting the state's motion. This Court should reverse both orders and remand with directions
that the petition be granted and that a judgment of acquittal be entered with regard to Count II.
Respectfully submitted this ~ o f April, 2014.

Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Shane Crawford
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MELANSON, Judge
Shane Erick Crawford appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentences for two
counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for a new trial.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In 2010, the state filed a complaint charging Crawford with two counts of lewd conduct
with a minor under the age of sixteen, LC. § 18-1508, identified as Count I and Count II. The
state also charged Crawford with two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen
(Counts III and IV). The alleged victim in Count I was Victim I and the alleged victim in the
remaining counts was Victim II.

Crawford was found guilty of Count I and Count II and

acquitted of the two remaining counts. The district court imposed concurrent unified terms of
twenty five years, with minimu~ periods of confinement of six years, for Count I and Count II.
Crawford appeals.

{
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II.
ANALYSIS

Crawford argues that the district court denied his right to due process by failing to
instruct the jury, in response to a jury question, that the breast area is not a genital for the
purpose of finding Crawford guilty of lewd conduct pursuant to I.C. § 18-1508. Crawford also
argues that the district court imposed excessive sentences.

A.

Jury Question

Idaho Code Section 18-1508 provides:
Any person who shall commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or
with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child under the age of
sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oralgenital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or
manual-genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or
who shall involve such minor child in any act of bestiality or sado-masochism as
defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code, wheri any of such acts are done with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires
of such person, such minor child, or third party, shall be guilty of a felony and
shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not more than life.
Here, in Count I, the state alleged that Crawford committed lewd conduct with Victim I by
having manual-genital contact with her with the intent to appeal to and or gratify his sexual
desire. Likewise, the state alleged in Count II that Crawford committed lewd conduct with
Victim II by having manual-genital contact with her with the intent to appeal to and or gratify his
sexual desire.
At trial, Victim I testified that, while she was lying on a couch in a living room and
watching a movie with Crawford, Crawford reached up her shirt and groped her breasts and then
moved his hand into her underwear and touched her vagina. Victim II testified that, while she
was in a kitchen with Crawford, Crawford asked her "what a clit was." Victim II testified that,
when she responded that she did not know, Crawford said, "Well, let me show you;" approached
her as she backed away; and put his hand up her shorts and touched the outside of her vaginal
area. Victim II also testified that, on another occasion, she was on a couch with Crawford and he
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rubbed her upper thigh and moved up toward her "bikini line." Victim II further testified that, on
a different occasion, Crawford exposed his penis and tried to show it to her but she looked away.
Additionally, Victim II testified that Crawford grabbed her breast in front of others at a party in a
joking way. Finally, Victim II testified that, while she was on the phone on one occasion with
her grandfather, Crawford began rubbing her stomach and moving his hand toward her breast,
but she kept pushing Crawford's hand away.
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury:
At the end of the day and at the end of your deliberations, I'm going to ask
you to come back and return a verdict of guilty against [Crawford], guilty of
[Count I] involving [Victim I] on the sofa for rubbing her tummy, going up to her
breasts and down into her vagina .
. . . . [Count II] is [Victim II] and this is the episode where [Victim II]
testified [Crawford] asked her if she knew what her clit was and he put her fingers
up. That's what [Count II] is referring to.
·
[Count III] refers to when [Crawford] pulled his penis out, he exposed it
and nudged [Victim II] and told her to look and talked about how he groomed it.
That's [Count III].
And [Count IV] is when [Crawford] grabs [Victim H's] breasts and also
when he's rubbing up toward her panty line getting closer and closer.
During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the district court asking, "In order
to have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area? Does
touching of the breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?" Outside the presence of the jury,
Crawford's counsel indicated that he believed the answer was "no." The district court stated,
"No, the answer is reread the instructions. I'm not going to define for them manual-genital
contact." The state agreed with the district court. The district court concluded:
Well, if the jury--I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there's
case law that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but that
while--while it may seem--it's tempting to want to define every single word, that
it's inappropriate 'for the court to do so and that the jurors have to apply their
understanding--their common ordinary understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm
just going to tell them to reread the instructions.
Thus, the district court informed the jury to "re-read all the instructions." During deliberations,
the jury also asked the district court to confirm that:
[Count !]-[Victim I] on couch incident
[Count II]-[Victim II] being asked about "cf it"
[Count IIl]-Penis exposure to [Victim II]
[ Count IV]-[Victim II] on phone [with] grandfather [ and] touching her
3
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In response, the district court infonned the jury that the alleged victim in Count I was Victim I,
the alleged victim in the remaining counts was Victim II, and the jury was to rely on its memory
of the evidence.
As noted above, Crawford argues that the district court denied his right to due process by
responding to the jury's question without clarifying that the breast area is not a genital for the
purpose of finding Crawford guilty of lewd conduct pursuant to LC. § 18-1508. In general, it is
within the trial court's discretion to determine whether, and the manner in which, to respond to a
question posed by the jury during deliberations. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d
956, 971 (2003); State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154, 772 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
This grant of discretion is premised on the assumption that the instructions as given are clear,
direct, and proper statements of the law.

Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 282, 77 P.3d at 971.

Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or confusion on a point of law correctly and adequately
coveted in a given instruction, the trial court in its discretion may explain the given instruction or
further instruct the jury, but it is under no duty to do so. Id However, if a jury makes explicit its
difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap
in the instructions, then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law
as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or confusion. Id
Here, Crawford was charged with two counts of lewd conduct pursuant to LC. § 18-1508.
Jury instruction thirteen informed the jury that, in order to find Crawford guilty of lewd conduct
as charged in Count I, the jury had to find that the state proved Crawford committed an act of
manual-genital contact upon or with the body of Victim I. Jury instruction fourteen instructed
the jury in the same manner with respect to Count II and Victim II. By asking, "In order to have
committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the vaginal area? Does touching of
the breast-area constitute manual-genital contact?" the jury expressed doubt or confusion on a
point of law not adequately covered in the jury instructions and pertinent to this case, thereby
revealing a defect, ambiguity, or gap in the instructions. Thus, the district court had the duty to
give additional instructions on the law reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or
confusion. In State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 487, 80 P.3d 1083, 1088 (2003), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the act of touching of a minor's chest area does not fall within those
acts specifically enumerated in LC. § 18-1508 and a defendant cannot be convicted under the
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statute for such contact. Therefore, as a matter of law, touching a child's breast area does not
amount to manual-genital contact. By answering the jury's question regarding whether touching
of the breast area constitutes manual-genital contact with the instruction to "re-read all the
instructions" and by not informing the jury of the Court's holding in Kavajecz, the district court
erred.
However, error is harmless and not reversible if the reviewing court is convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,221,245 P.3d 961,973 (2010). Thus, we examine whether the alleged

error complained of in the present case was harmless. See State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578,
114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005).
Crawford argues that it is impossible to discern whether the jury reached its verdict with
respect ~o Count I and Count II on a valid theory of law because the jury heard testimony from
both Victim I and Victim II that Crawford had touched their breast area. Therefore, Crawford
asserts that, pursuant to State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 888, 865 P.2d 972, 979 (1993), his
judgment of conviction and sentences must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial.
In Townsend, the jury was instructed that it could convict Townsend of aggravated

battery if it found that Townsend's use of either his vehicle or his hands during the battery
constituted use of a deadly weapon as proscribed by the statute. However, the instruction that
the jury could find Townsend guilty of aggravated battery by considering his hands deadly
weapons was legally incorrect because hands do not constitute deadly weapons under the statute.

Id at 887, 865 P.2d at 978. The jury verdict did not specify whether the jury found that the
aggravated battery was committed With Townsend's vehicle, his hands, or both. Thus, the Court
was unable to discern whether the jury based its verdict on a valid or an invalid legal theory. The
Court determined that the appropriate disposition, in view of the holding that one of the theories
of criminal liability given to the jury (use of the vehicle as a deadly weapon) was legally valid
and the other theory by which the jury was instructed it could find Townsend guilty of
aggravated battery (use of his hands as deadly weapons) was legally invalid, was to vacate the
conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new trial. Id at 888, 865 P.2d at 979.
The state argues that, even if the district court erred by not instructing the jury that
touching of a minor's chest area does not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in LC.
§ 18-1508 in response to the jury question, such error was harmless regarding Count II because
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that count did not involve any testimony or allegat_ion that Crawford touched Victim II's breasts.
We agree. As noted above, during closing argument, the state argued what conduct Crawford
allegedly committed that constituted the offense of lewd conduct charged in Count II.
Specifically, the state infonned the jury that Count II involved the episode where Crawford
allegedly asked Victim II "if she knew what her clit was and he put her fingers up." Defense
counsel, during closing argument, referred to Count II as involving the same incident.
Additionally, during deliberations, the jury asked the district court to confirm that the alleged
conduct related to Count II was Victim II "being asked about 'clit'." Thus, we are Convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that, with respect to Count II, the jury did not consider Victim II's
testimony regarding Crawford's touching of her breast area at other times and reached its verdict
on a valid legal theory. Therefore, even though the district court erred by not instructing the jury
that touching of a minor's chest area does not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in
J.C.§ 18-1508 in response to the jury question, such error was harmless regarding Count IL
However, with respect to Count I, the episode in which the state alleged Crawford
committed lewd conduct included his touching of both Victim I's breast and vaginal areas.
Specifically, the state alleged that Count I involved Victim I "on the sofa for rubbing her tummy,
going up to her breasts and down into her vagina." Further, the jury asked the district court to
confirm that the alleged conduct related to Count I was Victim I "on couch incident." Instruction
provided to the jury must not permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not
constitute the type of crime charged. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342, 256 P.3d 735, 750
(2011). Because of the district court's lack of instruction to the jury that touching of a minor's
chest area did not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in LC. § 18-1508 in response to
the jury question, the jury could have found Crawford guilty of lewd conduct on Count I based
on an invalid legal theory--that Crawford committed manual-genital contact with Victim II by
touching her breast area. Because it is impossible to discern what theory the jury based its
verdict on, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error did not
contribute to the jury's verdict with respect to Count I. Thus, the error was not was harmless.
As in Townsend, the appropriate disposition is to vacate Crawford's conviction and sentence
with respect to Count I and remand the case for a new trial.
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B.

Excessive Sentences

Crawford also argues that the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive.
Because we vacate Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to Count I, we
need only address Crawford's claim with respect to Count II.
An appellate revi~w of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v.

Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct, App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal,
the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such
an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89., 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it
appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard
for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When
reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387,391 (2007).
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the district court noted that it wanted to make sure
Crawford's sentence fulfilled the objectives of protecting the community and the victims. The
district court also noted that it did not believe Crawford was amenable to rehabilitation in the
short term. The district court detailed six disciplinary actions taken against Crawford while he
was incarcerated on an unrelated matter.

The district court further commented that it was

surprised that, having been in the military, Crawford had difficulty following the rules. The
district court determined that Crawford's inability to follow rules did not make him a good
candidate for being out in the community. In addition, the district court noted the findings in the
psychosexual evaluation that Crawford was a moderate risk to reoffend and tended to manage
emotions through repression and denial, which seemed to influence his engaging in inappropriate
sexual behavior. The district court also noted the findings in the psychosexual evaluation that
Crawford was not amenable to sex offender treatment due to his lack of acknowledgement of
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inappropriate sexual behavior. The district court determined that, because Crawford was not
amenable to treatment, he needed to be incarcerated for a significant period of time. In light of
the foregoing, the district court imposed a unified term of twenty five years, with a minimum
period of confinement of six years, for Count IL
After an independent review of the record and having regard for the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest, we conclude that the
sentence imposed by the district court with respect to Count II was reasonable upon the facts of
this case. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Crawford to a unified
term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of six years, for Count II.

III.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred by answering the jury's question regarding whether touching of
the breast area constitutes manual-genital contact pursuant to I.C. § I 8.,1508 with the instruction
to "re-read all the instructions" and by not instructing the jury that the act of touching a minor's
chest area does not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in the statute. While such error
was harmless with respect to Count II, the error was not harmless with respect to Count I. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing Crawford's sentence for Count IL
Accordingly, we affirm Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to Count
II, but we vacate Crawford's judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to Count I and
remand for a new trial.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LANSING, CONCUR.
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